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THE “NIXON SABOTAGE”: THE POLITICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CHALLENGE TO THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
Danieli Evans* 
Abstract: Critics of the Voting Rights Act argue that the anti-discrimina-
tion law requires states to engage in unconstitutional discrimination, as 
state decisionmakers must be conscious of race in order to ensure that 
voting policies do not weaken minority representation. This argument re-
lies on the idea that subjective racial motivation is the essence of uncon-
stitutional discrimination (even if benevolent, or to promote racial inclu-
sion). The conventional understanding among constitutional scholars is 
that this “search for the bigoted decisionmaker” developed in employ-
ment and housing discrimination decisions between 1976 and 1979. Pre-
vious accounts have not recognized the role that the 1971 school deseg-
regation decision of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
played in laying the foundations for this definition of unconstitutional 
discrimination. Swann is important because it vividly illustrates how the 
elected branches gave traction to the present definition of unconstitu-
tional discrimination. The justices’ archives reveal the Swann Court’s un-
certainty about focusing on the racial motives of present authorities as the 
basis for finding unconstitutional discrimination, and that a narrow ma-
jority preferred a draft of the opinion that eschewed this approach. Yet all 
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justices acquiesced to Chief Justice Burger’s self-assigned opinion, which 
emphasized subjective racial motives as the core of unconstitutional dis-
crimination, and as Justice Douglas described it, “wr[ote] President 
Nixon’s view . . . into the law.” The justices did so because they perceived 
unanimity as necessary for compliance in the face of both political 
branches objecting to judicial authority in the area of school desegrega-
tion. Swann demonstrates how the view of unconstitutional discrimination 
that centers on racial motives first gained traction out of deference to po-
litical branches calling for limits on judicial policymaking. This concern 
that animated defining unconstitutional discrimination in terms of racial 
motives—judges making social policy under the guise of constitutional 
remedies—does not apply in the current challenge to the Voting Rights 
Act, when the Court is asked to extend the racial-motives limitation, 
forged in deference to elected officials, to restrict the ways that elected of-
ficials have chosen to address discrimination. 
Introduction 
 Critics of the Voting Rights Act argue that the anti-discrimination 
law, designed to eliminate racial discrimination in voting, requires 
states to engage in unconstitutional discrimination.1 This conflict arises 
from the contemporary view that racial motivation is the essence of 
constitutionally prohibited discrimination. Under this view, policies 
that effectively exclude members of one race—school zoning that rein-
forces neighborhood segregation, voter identification laws that dispro-
portionately keep Hispanic voters away from the polls, and “verbal 
skills” tests that systematically disfavor black job applicants—are consti-
tutionally permissible if the burden on racial groups is apparent but 
not intended, or incidental.2 And the corollary of this focus on racial 
motives as the essential characteristic of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion is that racial motivation designed to include, rather than exclude, 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that 
Title VII forces unconstitutional discrimination by “requiring employers to evaluate the 
racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial 
outcomes”); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et al. at 11–13, Shelby Cnty., 
Ala. v. Holder, No. 12–96 (U.S. argued Feb. 27, 2013), 2013 WL 50689 [hereinafter Brief 
Amicus Curiae] (complaining that Section 5 is chiefly enforced by the “effects test” which 
“embodies an explicit racial classification”). 
2 For further discussion, see Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The 
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1130 (1997), stating 
“the Constitution permits the state to act in ways that perpetuate, or even aggravate, the 
racial stratification of American society; it is only race-based state action or state action 
animated by racially discriminatory purposes that violates tenets of equal protection . . . .” 
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members of different races is also claimed to be suspect as unconstitu-
tional discrimination. 
 Although the Constitution does not prohibit unintended racial 
discrimination, Congress has chosen to address such discrimination 
through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment 
criteria that tend to exclude applicants of a particular race, and Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits covered states from chang-
ing their voting policies in ways that effectively weaken a minority 
group’s ability to elect its preferred candidate.3 As these public policies 
are threatened by the understanding that any form of racial motivation 
is unconstitutional, I aim to illustrate how this understanding gained 
traction out of deference to political pressure.4 This is particularly rele-
vant now, as critics urge the Court to extend the racial-motives limita-
tion, shaped by deference to political branches, to limit how the politi-
cal branches can define discrimination. 
 Unconstitutional discrimination has not always been defined in 
terms of racial motivation. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, courts 
were called upon to address segregated attendance patterns that per-
sisted in southern school systems over a decade after the Court outlawed 
official segregation and states abolished laws that overtly segregated stu-
dents. These courts began to question whether racial motivation, or of-
ficial action contrived to segregate students, was a necessary element of 
unconstitutional discrimination. School boards defended the present 
segregated attendance patterns on the grounds that they were a result of 
lasting private discrimination, rather than contemporaneous official ac-
tion intended to segregate students. These school boards argued that if 
racial motivation was the constitutional wrong, present day officials were 
innocent, as they harbored no racial motives; the racially-motivated de-
cisions were made so long ago that they had no bearing on the intent of 
present school authorities, and these remote decisions should not be a 
                                                                                                                      
3 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c, 2000e (2006). 
4 I am not the first to make this point. Reva Siegel observes that the Equal Protection-
discriminatory purpose decisions of the Burger Court restricted the role of federal courts 
in overseeing the disestablishment of racial segregation out of concern for separation of 
powers and federalism values, effectively shifting the prerogative for making antidiscrimi-
nation policy to elected branches of government. Reva Siegel, The Law (and Politics) of 
Disparate Impact 3, 41 (Feb. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
Siegel also notes that in recent years the Court has been rescinding this deferential princi-
ple by exerting increasing control over elected officials’ antidiscrimination initiatives. Id. at 
33. This essay corroborates Siegel’s claim by illustrating the extent to which emphasis on 
racial motives was a compromise to President Nixon and Congress’s resistance, and locat-
ing the roots of discriminatory purpose analysis even earlier in the decade, showing how 
the busing conflict caused the discriminatory purpose limitation to gain traction. 
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basis for liability of present-day officials.5 Where racial motives were re-
mote in time or ambiguous, courts regularly considered evidence of 
disparate or segregative effects in determining whether segregated pat-
terns amounted to unconstitutional discrimination.6 The conventional 
understanding among constitutional scholars is that the Supreme Court 
declared racial-motivation (“the search for the bigoted decision-
maker”7) as the essence of unconstitutional discrimination in employ-
ment and housing discrimination decisions between 1976 and 1979.8 
These accounts overlook how this formulation gained meaningful trac-
tion several years earlier, in the Supreme Court’s 1971 school desegrega-
tion decision of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.9 
Swann’s role is particularly significant because it illustrates how defer-
ence to political decision making first influenced the Court’s focus on 
racial motives as the core of unconstitutional discrimination. In fact, a 
majority of the Swann Court expressed reservations about the relevance 
of racial motives; expressing concern that limiting judicial remedies to 
undoing race-motivated decisions would leave unaddressed many forms 
of entrenched patterns of racial separation, set in motion by state action 
                                                                                                                      
5 Brief of Respondents at 46, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 
(1971) (No. 281), 1970 WL 122646 (“[F]rom the moment Brown I was announced all fed-
eral, state and local laws requiring or permitting segregation were void and of no effect. 
On and after May 31, 1955, there plainly could be no de jure racial discrimination in any 
school system in the United States. What was left, North and South, was segregation in the 
schools in fact.”). 
6 See Siegel, supra note 4, at 8–9 (discussing the role of effects evidence in Equal Pro-
tection decisions of the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeal). 
7 See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1509 (2d ed. 1988). 
8 Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1779, 1785 (2012). Lopez 
explains that the consensus among constitutional scholars is to recognize Personnel Admin-
istrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), as the 
source of the discrimination doctrine “requir[ing] direct proof regarding the minds of 
government actors.” Id. Lopez also questions this consensus, observing that courts were 
looking to a different form of purposeful discrimination before these cases, but contends 
that prior to these decisions the meaning of intentional discrimination was a contextual 
inquiry into whether “the interests behind the challenged government action were gener-
ally legitimate or illegitimate, innocent or tainted by racism—rather than establishing 
whether prejudice or bias on the part of any individual was directly at work.” Id. at 1797. 
Lopez also overlooks how Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 
(1970), influenced this standard. For further discussion, see generally Reva B. Siegel, 
Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over 
Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470 (2004), recounting the evolution from focus on discrimi-
natory effects to focus on race-conscious decision making, and Reva Siegel, Why Equal Pro-
tection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 
1111 (1997). 
9 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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that occurred decades ago, and could not be traced to the motives of 
contemporary authorities. Swann shows how values of judicial restraint 
undergirded the contemporary understanding of unconstitutional dis-
crimination as much or more than the majority’s understanding of what 
it meant to violate constitutional equality guarantees. This raises the 
question of what role the value of judicial restraint should play in today’s 
decisions, where parties ask the Court to restrict the way that elected 
officials may define and address discrimination. 
I. The Battle over Busing 
 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, President Nixon was charged 
with a complicated balancing act: The public had “extraordinary expec-
tations” after Brown v. Board of Education and the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act, both recognized as great triumphs of the preceding dec-
ade.10 More than a decade after Brown outlawed official segregation, 
courts were faced with suits challenging lasting segregated attendance 
patterns. This required the Supreme Court to determine at what point a 
state had discharged its duty to dismantle a formerly segregated system, 
and whether state actors could be required to take measures to undo 
segregation that resulted from policies adopted by former officials many 
decades ago, and had been abandoned over a decade ago.11 Many of 
the race-neutral assignment policies that states had adopted following 
Brown—i.e., allowing students to voluntarily transfer out of their for-
mally segregated schools, or assigning students to their neighborhood 
schools—had the effect of perpetuating previously segregated school 
assignments or residential segregation (these were intertwined, because 
segregated schools had led to segregated neighborhoods). In 1968, in 
Green v. County School Board, the Court held that a “freedom of choice” 
policy that gave white and black students the option of transferring out 
of their formerly segregated schools did little to ameliorate racial sepa-
ration—so few students transferred that there was still effectively a 
“white” school and a “black” school.12 Thus, the Court required the 
county to integrate students so that the schools were no longer “‘racially 
                                                                                                                      
10 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Lawrence J. McAndrews, The Politics of 
Principle: Richard Nixon and School Desegregation, 83 J. Negro Hist. 187, 187 (1998); see also 
Dean J. Kotlowski, Nixon’s Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Policy (2001) 
(discussing President Nixon’s policies on civil rights). 
11 See, e.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 431–32 (1968). 
12 Id. at 440–42. 
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identifiable.’”13 Following Green, lower courts throughout the country 
began to strike down neutral state policies that effectively preserved seg-
regation, absent evidence that present day school authorities adopted the 
policies with racial motives. For instance, in 1969 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed a decision finding that Washington 
D.C.’s race-neutral policy of assigning students to their neighborhood 
schools was unconstitutional because it had the foreseeable effect of 
perpetuating residential segregation, even if the school board did not 
intend to segregate students.14 The court explained, “we . . . firmly rec-
ognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous 
and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a 
willful scheme.”15 
 At the same time, public outrage was mounting as parents objected 
to court orders forcing their children to transfer to a remote school, 
because many families chose their residences based on proximity to a 
desired local school. Members of Congress proposed legislation that 
prohibited courts from ordering students to be bussed between school 
districts, to be assigned to schools based on their race, or attempt to 
equalize attendance between the races.16 They declared that “[p]arents 
are not going to permit their children to be boxed up and crated and 
hauled around the city and the country like common animals,’” and 
encouraged support of these amendments to “prevent our schools 
from becoming the laboratories of fanatical social reformers and race-
obsessed judges.”17 In 1970, the Senate passed an amendment requir-
ing school desegregation to be implemented the same way throughout 
the country, regardless of the history of segregation in a particular re-
gion.18 Southern members of Congress thought it unfair that northern 
                                                                                                                      
13 Id. at 440 n.5, 441 (quoting U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 1967, Southern School 
Desegregation, 1966–1967, at 88 (1967)). In the three years that the county’s freedom of 
choice plan had been operating, not a single white child has chosen to attend the formerly 
“black” school and only 115 black children enrolled in formerly “white” school, leaving 
eighty-five percent of the black students attending the “black” school. Id. at 441. 
14 Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1969), aff’g Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. 
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). 
15 Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 497. Then a judge on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Burger dis-
sented, quoting commentators who criticized the decision’s “unclear basis in precedent, its 
potentially enormous scope, and its imposition of responsibilities which may strain the 
resources and endanger the prestige of the judiciary.” Smuck, 408 F.2d at 196 (Burger, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School 
Board, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1525 (1968)). 
16 Warren Weaver, Jr., South’s Senators Seek Busing Ban in Fund Measure, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
5, 1970, at 1. 
17 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18 Act of April 13, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121. 
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cities got away with segregated attendance patterns merely because they 
had not officially segregated students; they hoped that northerners 
would stop supporting desegregation if they were subject to the same 
desegregation busing that the South had been.19 Yale Law School Pro-
fessor Alexander Bickel published a well-known article concluding that 
widespread school integration would not be attained quickly because 
no one was certain that the benefits outweighed the costs.20 The Wash-
ington Post observed that “Congress seems sure this year to finally pass 
an anti-integration amendment,” which might give rise to a constitu-
tional conflict between Congress and the courts.21 
 President Nixon was on the side of Congress and popular opinion 
in opposing judicial activism in the area of school desegregation. In the 
1968 election, Nixon had campaigned on the promise of appointing a 
southerner to the Court, and looking for judges who were “strict con-
structionist[s].”22 When Justice Abraham Fortas, a liberal who was 
President Johnson’s nominee for replacing Chief Justice Warren, failed 
Senate confirmation due to corruption allegations, Nixon appointed 
Burger to Chief Justice.23 Then Nixon’s Justice Department, based on 
legal memoranda prepared by then-Assistant Attorney General William 
Rehnquist, initiated a criminal investigation against Justice Fortas—the 
first criminal investigation ever initiated by the Executive against a sit-
ting Justice—and leaked the story to the press in order to pressure Jus-
tice Fortas to resign from the Court entirely.24 Upon Fortas’s resigna-
tion, Nixon unsuccessfully nominated two southern judges, Clement 
Haynsworth and G. Harold Carswell, both of whom the Senate rejected, 
in part, because they had both overtly endorsed segregation.25 Nixon 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Warren Weaver, Jr., Ribicoff Attacks Schools in North; Supports Stennis, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 9, 1970, at 1. 
20 Alexander M. Bickel, Desegregation: Where Do We Go from Here?, New Republic, Feb. 7, 
1970, at 20, 22 (“Massive school integration is not going to be attained in this country very 
soon, in good part because no one is certain that it is worth the cost.”). 
21 Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Integrationists at HEW Losing Fight for Full Administra-
tion Support, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1970, at A17. 
22 John A. Jenkins, The Partisan: The Life of William Rehnquist 95–96 (2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
23 See id. at 90–94. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at 96–101. Then Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist was responsible for vet-
ting nominees. See id. at 95–96. He described Haynsworth as a “strict constructionist” who 
“will not be favorably inclined toward claims of either criminal defendants or civil rights 
plaintiffs.” Id. at 96. Carswell had been involved in the formation of several “white only” 
clubs, and in a public speech he had stated “I believe that segregation of the races is 
proper and the only practical and correct way of life in our states. I have always so believed 
and I shall always so act . . . .” Id. at 99. 
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declared that he would not subject another southerner to this “kind of 
malicious character assassination,” an “act of regional discrimination,” 
and promised that “the day will come when men like Judges Carswell 
and Haynsworth can and will sit on the High Court.”26 Instead of a 
southerner, Nixon appointed Harry Blackmun, Burger’s childhood 
friend.27 Blackman was also the best man at Justice Burger’s wedding 
(they were called “the Minnesota twins”), and Nixon expected him to 
vote with Burger.28 
 In a March 1970 statement on school desegregation—a particularly 
legalistic opinion for the President to deliver in a public address—Nixon 
described “serious problems” arising from the “accelerating pace” of 
school desegregation.29 The President stated that, “[i]n the absence of 
definitive Supreme Court rulings,” there were “both real and apparent 
contradictions” among lower courts on how to address these prob-
lems.30 Furthermore, Nixon reiterated that “[t]wo very recent Federal 
court decisions continue to illustrate the range of opinion[s]: a plan of a 
southern school district [was] upheld even though three schools re-
main[ed] all-black, but a northern school system [was] ordered by an-
other Federal court to integrate all of its schools completely . . . .”31 And 
Nixon set forth an authoritative summary suggesting the proper consti-
tutional principles applicable to school desegregation: “[w]hatever a few 
lower courts might have held to the contrary, the prevailing trend in 
judicial opinion” is that “de jure segregation arises by law or by deliberate 
official action and is unconstitutional” whereas “de facto segregation re-
sults from residential housing patterns and does not violate the constitu-
tion.”32 Accordingly, President Nixon stated that “[i]n determining 
whether school authorities are responsible for existing racial segrega-
tion—and thus whether they are constitutionally required to remedy 
it—the intent of their action . . . is a crucial factor.”33 President Nixon 
also recognized that “where housing patterns produce substantially all-
Negro or all-white schools, and where this racial separation has not been 
caused by deliberate official action[,] school authorities are not consti-
                                                                                                                      
26 Id. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27 Id. 
28 Jenkins, supra note 22, at 101. 
29 Presidential Statement About Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools, 
1970 Pub. Papers 304, 310 (Mar. 24, 1970). 
30 Id. at 308. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 309. 
33 Id. at 309–10. 
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tutionally required to take any positive steps to correct the imbalance.”34 
And further indication of Nixon’s reservation about aggressive school 
desegregation was that he “eased” his good friend, Robert Finch, the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, out of this position, “in 
part for pressing too hard on integration.”35 
II. The Swann Case 
 In 1969, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina ordered a 
plan to integrate schools in the county of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 
North Carolina—the 43rd largest school district in the nation, span-
ning 550 square miles, and 107 schools.36 The district court did so after 
finding that the Board’s “pupil assignment system has continued and in 
some situations accentuated patterns of racial segregation in housing, 
school attendance and community development.”37 Although school 
officials had deliberately segregated students during the decades before 
the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, contemporary 
school authorities argued that any segregation in the system should not 
be found unconstitutional because they were neither personally re-
sponsible for the segregated patterns that persisted nor culpable of 
harboring racial motives. The court acknowledged that the present-day 
school officials “did not originate” the patterns, but declared “now is 
the time to stop acquiescing in [the segregated] patterns.”38 The dis-
trict court initially disavowed any judgment about the motives of pre-
sent-day school officials,39 observing that the present-day Charlotte 
school authorities had, in fact, done a relatively remarkable job at 
remedying segregation, “achiev[ing] a degree and volume of desegre-
gation of schools apparently unsurpassed in these parts.”40 But the 
court’s later opinion found that that the board’s school location poli-
cies had reinforced residential segregation.41 
                                                                                                                      
 
34 Id. at 310. 
35 The Administration: Bus Stop, Time, Aug. 16, 1971, at 10. 
36 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1364, 1373 (W.D.N.C. 
1969). 
37 Id. at 1372. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (“The observations in this opinion are not intended to reflect upon the motives 
or the judgment of the School Board members.” (emphasis added)). 
40 Id. 
41 In its brief before the Supreme Court, the school board pointed out the district 
court’s inconsistency on whether present school officials had engaged in race-motivated 
decision making: 
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 Swann presented a question that had begun to arise in a number 
of cases, because official, state sponsored segregation was becoming 
more remote in time: could persistent segregated patterns be found 
unconstitutional when contemporary authorities denied racial motives, 
and had even by all counts made marginally successful efforts toward 
undoing segregation? The school board argued that present-day au-
thorities were well intentioned, and any racial motivation was too re-
mote to be a basis for holding contemporary authorities liable. This 
long after Brown, the motives question was irrelevant, and “[w]hat was 
left, North and South, was segregation in the schools in fact.”42 
  When Swann reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger 
recognized its importance. He told the other justices that the case was so 
critical that he wanted to forego ordinary court procedures.43 Normally, 
the justices would conference following argument, vote on their pre-
ferred outcome, and the most senior justice in the majority would assign 
the majority opinion.44 Instead, Justice Burger held two special confer-
ences in which, despite six justices expressing support for affirming the 
district court, he postponed taking a vote.45 In the words of Justice 
Brennan’s clerks, the “six were astounded” when Justice Burger sud-
denly circulated his own draft of the opinion reversing, rather than af-
firming, the district court’s order. The draft came just one day after the 
second conference, meaning that Justice Burger must have been prepar-
                                                                                                                      
the district court gratuitously and without the benefit of further evidentiary 
hearings reversed its previous findings that segregation in Charlotte was de 
facto. The trial judge attributed to the School Board every real or fancied ill 
that beset the Charlotte-Mecklenburg community and stemmed from federal, 
state, local and private action. 
Brief of Respondents, supra note 5, at 43. 
42 Id. at 46. 
43 Opinions of William J. Brennan, Jr., at XXVII–XXVIII (October Term, 1970) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the Brennan Papers at the Library of Congress Manuscript 
Division [Box II:6, Folder 6, No:70-281]). 
44 This convention has been well documented. See Bernard Schwartz, Decision: 
How the Supreme Court Decides Cases 44–55 (1996); Bernard Schwartz, Swann’s 
Way: The School Busing Case and the Supreme Court (1986); Bob Woodward & 
Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court 506–07 (2005); Law-
rence S. Wrightsman, Judicial Decision Making: Is Psychology Relevant? 97–98 
(1999); The Douglas Letters 185 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987); Timothy R. Johnson et 
al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 Law & Soc’y Rev. 349, 371 
(2005); Kaitlyn L. Sill et al., Strategic Passing and Opinion Assignment on the Burger Court, 31 
Just. Sys. J. 164 (2010). 
45 Opinions of William J. Brennan, Jr., supra note 43, at XXVII–XXVIII. 
2013] The Political Origins of the Equal Protection Challenge to the Voting Rights Act 335 
ing it months before the second conference.46 Justice Douglas, the most 
senior justice in the majority, responded “[t]he case obviously was for 
me to assign and I would have assigned it to Stewart. To our surprise the 
Chief Justice assigned . . . himself . . . to write Nixon’s view of ‘freedom 
of choice’ into the law.”47 Burger’s draft found that the lower court had 
gone too far in ordering constitutional remedies for segregation that 
resulted from neighborhood school assignments and private residential 
segregation, factors that were not attributable to the racial motives of 
present day school authorities.48 The justices in the majority voiced their 
disagreement with Burger’s draft. Justice Douglas objected: 
You state, I believe that “discrimination” means the “discrimi-
natory location of school sites or distortion of school size in 
order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation.” If 
this is the only “discrimination” that can be cured, the orders 
for integration would seem to be quite limited. Apparently the 
board could build schools to serve the population of the area, 
but should place them on the basis of numbers and need, not 
on race. Presumably a school could be built in the ghetto, or 
in the white neighborhood, if numbers required, and need 
not be integrated. A District Court would seem to have the 
task of determining if the board built any schools for the pur-
pose of racial segregation. If so, the District Court would de-
termine where schools would have been built, absent such a 
motive, construct attendance lines around those areas, and 
bus students to the schools in those areas which they would 
have attended. This does not seem likely to result in Blacks at-
tending suburban schools or Whites attending schools in the 
central city.49 
For Justice Douglas, there was sufficient state action in reinforcing seg-
regation, even if the school board’s motives for adopting neighborhood 
schools were benign, because it was “apparent and predictable” that “in 
Charlotte a neighborhood tends to be a group of homes generally simi-
                                                                                                                      
46 See The Douglas Letters, supra note 44, at 178; Opinions of William J. Brennan, 
Jr., supra note 43, at XXVIII. 
47 The Douglas Letters, supra note 44, at 179–80. 
48 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1970). 
49 Letter from Justice Douglas to Chief Justice Burger 3–4 (Dec. 10, 1970) (on file with 
the Brennan Papers at the Library of Congress Manuscripts and Archives [Box I:242, 
No:70-281]). 
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lar in race and income.”50 Justice Brennan responded that “if a higher 
degree of integration is easily achievable, to stop at a lower degree of 
integration will be to adopt a state policy that encourages segregation 
. . . .”51 
 Justice Stewart circulated his own draft dissent that argued for af-
firming the district court’s order, but took a moderate position, avoiding 
the question of whether the Constitution prohibits de facto segregation 
unrelated to state action. Instead, Justice Stewart described unconstitu-
tional state action more broadly than subjective motives of immediate 
authorities. Stewart’s account took the foreseeable long term effects of 
state policies into account, regardless of the motives of contemporary 
authorities. For Stewart, sustaining a system that had the foreseeable 
impact of preserving segregation was unconstitutional state action, re-
gardless of what present authorities intended. Rather than speaking 
specifically of the motives of present administrators, Stewart focused on 
the state’s “deep involvement” in “the maintenance” of segregated pat-
terns over time.52 The state’s involvement in maintaining or reinforcing 
segregation was evident here because neighborhood assignment policies 
had the foreseeable effect of preserving segregated attendance patterns 
that mirrored segregated residential patterns. It was possible to make 
this assessment “disregard[ing]…the extremely difficult problems that 
arise when it is necessary to test for discriminatory intent the maze of 
administrative decisions through which school officials may influence 
the racial composition of student bodies.”53 Because “[a] public school 
system is not built in a day; it is not built in isolation from the commu-
nity around it[;]” it develops “through innumerable decisions by hun-
dreds of educational and noneducational officials acting in many differ-
ent capacities[,]” and “[p]ractices, predispositions and attitudes build 
up in administrators, teachers, children, parents, and local noneduca-
tional officials[,]” the system “acquires a formidable stability and imper-
                                                                                                                      
50 See Justice Douglas Draft Dissent in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 8–
9 ( Jan. 13, 1971) (on file the Brennan Papers at the Library of Congress Manuscripts Divi-
sion [Box II:6 Folder 6, No: 70-281]). 
51 See Memorandum from Justice Brennan on Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ. 3 (Dec. 30, 1970) (on file with the Brennan Papers at the Library of Congress 
Manuscripts Division [Box II:6, Folder 6, No: 70-281]). 
52 Justice Stewart Draft Dissent in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 4–5 
(Feb. 1970) (on file with the Brennan Papers at the Library of Congress Manuscripts Divi-
sion [Box II:6, Folder 6, No:70-281]). 
53 Id. at 5. I emphasize the words “deep involvement” because they encompass more 
than racial motivation: “involvement” can be incidental or tacit, and can be found without 
the “extremely difficult” inquiry into the purpose behind official decisions. 
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viousness to change[,]” that may persist despite “conscious decisions for 
change by those in positions of responsibility.”54 Remedial action is war-
ranted to undo such deeply entrenched discrimination regardless of the 
motives of present-day authorities. Justices Douglas and Brennan told 
Justice Stewart that with one technical modification, he would have ma-
jority of five or six in support of his draft opinion “overnight.”55 
 Once Justice Burger got word of the support for Stewart’s draft, 
however, he told Stewart that he would modify his own draft into a 
unanimous opinion affirming the district court.56 At this point, the ma-
jority of five or six (Stewart, Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Harlan, and 
possibly White) supporting Stewart’s draft were faced with a compro-
mise. President Nixon’s criticism of court ordered desegregation, and 
specifically the integration order in Swann, increased the majority’s 
perception that a unanimous opinion was necessary.57 If Justices Bur-
ger, Blackmun, and Black dissented, the divided decision would likely 
fuel opposition from Congress and the President, as well as support for 
pending legislation to strip courts of jurisdiction to remedy school de-
segregation. The other justices decided to compromise in order to 
reach a unanimous opinion affirming the district court’s controversial 
integration order, even if it meant doing so based on reasoning that 
differed from the majority’s preferences.58 
 After seven drafts, Justice Burger produced an opinion that the 
other members of the Court would join. Justice Burger’s opinion makes 
the motives of present-day school authorities central to determining 
whether discrimination is unconstitutional: it states that school officials 
may negate an inference that one-race schools are unconstitutional by 
showing that the “racial composition is not the result of present or past 
                                                                                                                      
54 Id. 
55 The Douglas Letters, supra note 44, at 131. 
56 See Earl M. Maltz, The Chief Justiceship of Warren Burger, 1969–1986, at 
179–81 (2000). 
57 Id. at 179–80 (noting that, “for political reasons, the members of the majority des-
perately needed a unanimous opinion; . . . and dissenting opinions would only increase 
the possibility of militant opposition”). 
58 See id. at 180–81. For a much more thorough account of the Court’s internal delib-
erations over Swann and how the justices compromised to Justice Burger’s opinion because 
of the perceived importance of unanimity, see Schwartz, Swann’s Way, supra note 44, 
retelling the same account in even more detail, and Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 
44. These more detailed historical accounts of the Swann decision do not engage in the 
legal analysis that is the purpose of this essay. They do not consider how Justice Burger’s 
Swann opinion distinctly emphasized racial motives or how this difference was invoked in 
subsequent Equal Protection decisions. 
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discriminatory action on their part.”59 The opinion suggests, contrary to 
the district court initially disclaiming any finding on racial motives, that 
the constitutional remedy is warranted here because school authorities 
purposefully segregated students. Justice Burger states that school loca-
tions “have been used as a potent weapon for creating or maintaining a 
state-segregated school system” by building schools “specifically intended” 
for black or white students, “clos[ing] schools which appeared likely to 
become racially mixed,” and placing new schools in white suburban 
neighborhoods “in order to maintain the separation of the races . . . .”60 
 Unlike Justice Stewart’s draft, which found unconstitutional dis-
crimination because the neighborhood school assignments foreseeably 
maintained or reinforced private prejudice, Justice Burger’s opinion 
states, “[o]ur objective in dealing with the issues presented by these 
cases . . . does not and cannot embrace all the problems of racial preju-
dice, even when those problems contribute to disproportionate racial 
concentrations in some schools.”61 The opinion again emphasizes the 
subjective culpability of present-day school officials by recognizing that 
some degree of resegregation is likely to reoccur, but courts should not 
intervene “in the absence of a showing that either the school authori-
ties or some other agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix 
or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the 
schools . . . .”62 Although the majority prevailed in terms of securing its 
outcome, Justice Douglas expressed his dissatisfaction with the opinion, 
stating that “the Nixon sabotage worked in part.”63 Douglas was infuri-
ated with Justice Burger’s practice of assigning himself the majority 
opinion when he disagreed with its outcome; when this occurred in 
another important case, he chided “[w]hen a Chief Justice tries to bend 
the Court to his will by manipulating assignments, the integrity of the 
institution is imperiled . . . .”64 
III. The Shift in Unconstitutional Discrimination 
 Observers did not appreciate the extent that Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education furthered an understanding of unconsti-
tutional discrimination that had existed before with far less certainty. At 
the time of the Swann decision, Owen Fiss observed that Swann “added 
                                                                                                                      
59 Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added). 
60 Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
61 See id. at 23; Justice Stewart Draft Dissent, supra note 52. 
62 Swann, 402 U.S. at 32. 
63 See The Douglas Letters, supra note 44, at 179. 
64 Id. at 185. 
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another ingredient” to the constitutional analysis “emphasiz[ing] the 
role that past discriminatory conduct might have played in causing 
th[e] [segregated] patterns.”65 But he predicted that Swann indicated 
the Court was moving toward ruling that severe de facto segregation was 
unconstitutional, regardless of motives, because the racial motives were 
so remote in Swann that finding them “involve[d] significant elements 
of conjecture.”66 Fiss recognized that Swann stressed motivation by al-
lowing authorities to avoid liability by showing that segregated patterns 
were not a result of their racial motives.67 But he speculated that the 
Court’s willingness to presume or infer racial motives in Swann (a highly 
“conjectural” finding, because the motives were so remote) indicated 
that any sort of segregated pattern would give rise to a finding of racial 
motivation, that would be difficult for authorities to disprove. But the 
cases following Swann belie this prediction, as lack of racial motivation 
became a central, effective defense to finding unconstitutional discrimi-
nation despite segregated patterns. Once Justices Powell and Rehnquist 
joined the Court, Justice Burger’s Swann opinion leant significant trac-
tion to the four Nixon appointees who favored limiting constitutional 
liability to those culpable of race-motivated decision making. 
 Other cases that were decided during the same time period as 
Swann illustrate that the Court was debating the relevance of motives 
where former state officers had engaged in race-motivated decisions, 
but contemporary officials argued that their policies were not racially 
motivated. Justice Stewart’s 1972 majority opinion in Wright v. City of 
Emporia held a town's effort to secede from its school district unconsti-
tutional because it effectively reinforced segregation, regardless of 
whether the decision was animated by racial motives.68 Just as in Swann, 
the defendant-school board in Emporia argued that, although officials 
imposing official segregation decades earlier were racially motivated, 
present authorities’ decision to secede from the school district was not 
influenced by racial motives. Stewart took a position much closer to his 
draft Swann opinion, stating that because “an inquiry into the ‘domi-
nant’ motivation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless[,] 
. . . a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an imper-
                                                                                                                      
65 Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case—Its Significance for Northern School Deseg-
regation, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 697, 700 (1971). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 700–01. 
68 Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972) (citing Palmer v. Thompson, 
403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971)). 
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missible effect.”69 Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun 
dissented, criticizing the majority for “far exceed[ing]” Swann.70 The 
dissent stated that “normal judicial reluctance to probe the motives or 
purposes underlying official acts must yield to the realities in this very 
sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.”71 Swann and Emporia illus-
trate the Court’s uncertainty about whether racial motives were neces-
sary, and whether those motives had to be attributable to those cur-
rently or recently responsible, in order to find discriminatory patterns 
unconstitutional. 
 In 1973, in Keyes v. School District No. 1, the first case addressing a 
desegregation order in a northern city, the Court upheld a desegrega-
tion order based on a finding that school authorities had deliberately 
segregated students in schools in the central portion of the district.72 
The Court presumed that racial motivation in the central part of the 
school system suggested racial motives throughout. The Court empha-
sized the racial motives of particular authorities: because “the differen-
tiating factor . . . [of] de jure segregation . . . to which we referred in 
Swann is purpose or intent to segregate . . . [,]”73 authorities could negate 
the presumption that segregated schools in the outskirts of the district 
were also unconstitutional by showing that “their actions as to other 
segregated schools within the system were not also motivated by segre-
gative intent.”74 In at least four subsequent cases, the Court relied on 
Keyes and Swann to limit efforts at racial inclusion that went beyond 
remedying racially-motivated conduct.75 
                                                                                                                      
 
69 See id. (citations omitted). 
70 Id. at 471 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stewart distinguished Swann by saying it 
did not address the very narrow question of whether “a federal court may enjoin state or 
local officials from carving out a new school district from an existing district that has not 
yet completed the process of dismantling a system of enforced racial segregation.” Id. at 
453. But Stewart’s statements about the irrelevance of racial motives were nonetheless in 
tension with Swann, as the dissent observed. 
71 Id. at 482. 
72 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213–14 (1973). 
73 Id. at 208. 
74 See id. at 209. 
75 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (“[T]his Court[] [has] 
focus[ed] on prior discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a State’s 
adoption of race-based remedies.”); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 537 n.15 
(1982) (“A neighborhood school policy in itself does not offend the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 425 (1976) (“Since the post-1971 
shifts in the racial makeup of some of the schools resulted from changes in the demo-
graphics . . . neither the school officials nor the District Court were ‘constitutionally re-
quired to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once 
. . . racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system.’” (quoting 
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 The Court also applied racial motives to limit constitutional reme-
dies for employment, housing, and voting discrimination.76 In 1979, in 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Court quoted Swann 
for the proposition that “purposeful discrimination is ‘the condition 
that offends the Constitution.’”77 Feeney articulated what is understood 
to be the clearest statement of the contemporary standard: “‘[d]iscrim- 
inatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as 
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . se-
lected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘be-
cause of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group.”78 This was extended to voting rights. The Court cited Keyes 
in holding that where redistricting has the effect of weakening minority 
voting, “an illicit purpose must be proved before a constitutional viola-
tion can be found.”79 
 Since these decisions in the late 1970s, it has been taken for 
granted that courts only have the constitutional power to correct ra-
cially motivated action. But members of the Court have recently sug-
gested extending this principle to restrict the policies that Congress can 
make.80 Justices Roberts and Kennedy have argued that the Voting 
                                                                                                                      
 
Swann, 402 U.S. at 1, 32)); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974) (“Swann held, the 
task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, ‘the condition 
that offends the Constitution’ . . . . ‘[T]he nature of the violation determines the scope of 
the remedy.’”). 
76 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 
(1977) (denying a discrimination challenge to an ordinance that effectively excluded 
black residents from one area of the city by explaining, “[p]roof of racially discriminatory 
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Although 
some contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases, the holding in Davis 
reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety of contexts”) (citing Keyes, 413 U.S. at 
208); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 229, 240 (1976) (finding no unconstitutional 
discrimination where a police department’s “verbal skill[s]” test disproportionately ex-
cluded black applicants and explaining, “school desegregation cases . . . adhere[] to the 
basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially 
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”) (citing 
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 205). 
77 Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. 
at 16). 
78 See id. at 279 (citation omitted). 
79 See City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1980), superseded by statute, Vot-
ing Rights Act Amendments of 1982, sec. 3, § 2 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 
(2005)), as recognized in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (citing Arlington Heights, 
429 U.S. at 264–65; Davis, 426 U.S. at 240; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208). 
80 As discussed in note 4, Siegel explains that Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney repre-
sented a “settlement” with the political branches, whereby the Court shifted responsibility 
for antidiscrimination policy to elected officials. Siegel, however, observes that in recent 
years, the Court has eroded that settlement by exerting increasing control over the antidis-
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Rights Act “forces states to engage in ‘considerations of race that would 
doom a redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment.’”81 Jus-
tice Thomas contends that the “second generation barriers” to minority 
voting that Congress relied upon to reenact Section 5 in 2006 are “not 
probative of the type of purposeful discrimination” that justified a con-
gressional remedy in 1965.82 Justice Scalia has stated that the disparate 
impact provisions of Title VII, “requir[e] employers to evaluate the ra-
cial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (be-
cause of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is 
. . . discriminatory.”83 
 This argument is presented in the current challenge to the Voting 
Rights Act. There is concern that the Act is used to remedy discrimina-
tion not attributable to racial motives. In 2012, in Shelby County v. Holder, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that Congress re-
lied largely on evidence of indirect barriers to minority voting, such as 
“‘continued registration and turnout disparities’” when it reenacted Sec-
tion 5.84 In finding Section 5 justified, the court noted evidence of racial 
disparities—for instance, not one African American had ever been 
elected to statewide office in Mississippi, Louisiana, or South Carolina.85 
In the 2012 presidential election, courts relied upon Section 5 to block 
covered states from enacting voter identification laws and limits on early 
voting that were shown to disproportionately exclude or weaken the vot-
ing power of racial minorities.86 The concern is that Section 5 addresses 
these discriminatory effects, without any proof of racial motives. Amici 
complain that “enforcement of Section 5 has morphed from ending 
racially discriminatory voting practices to forcing specific racial out-
comes.”87 The dissent in Shelby asserted that by requiring states to ensure 
that their election policies do not weaken minority voting, Section 5 
“mandates race-conscious decisionmaking” that is in “tension with . . . 
                                                                                                                      
crimination policies that elected officials may adopt. Siegel, The Law (and Politics) of 
Disparate Impact, supra note 4, at 31–33. 
81 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (quoting 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491–92 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
82 Id. at 228 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
83 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279). 
84 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 
(2012) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 25 (2006)). 
85 Id. 
86 Adam Liptak, Voting Rights Act Is Challenged as a Cure the South Has Outgrown, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 2013, at A1. 
87 See Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 6. 
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the Reconstruction Amendments’ commitment to nondiscrimina-
tion.”88 
Conclusion 
 The story behind Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
illustrates that constitutional remedies were limited to race-motivated 
decisions, in part out of deference to Congress and the President, who 
objected to judges creating policy under the guise of constitutional 
remedies. Congress, however, has consistently chosen to define illegal 
discrimination more broadly than racial motivation. There are at least 
two good reasons that Congress could find it necessary to outlaw dis-
criminatory effects, as well as discriminatory motives, in order to effec-
tively combat racial discrimination. 
 First, defining discrimination in terms of invidious racial motiva-
tion is inconsistent with contemporary scientific understanding that 
discrimination mostly occurs subconsciously, rather than deliberately. 
Purposeful discrimination has long been recognized as immoral and 
taboo. As such, people are unlikely to recognize themselves as operat-
ing on prejudiced motives. An innate psychological drive to perceive 
ones’ own conduct as moral causes cognitive dissonance avoidance, 
which leads people to genuinely perceive their actions as motivated by 
legitimate justifications.89And people who perceive themselves as neu-
tral or non-prejudicial may be less on guard, and inadvertantly act in 
biased ways.90 Even employers expressly seeking to diversify their work-
                                                                                                                      
 
88 Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 887 (Williams, J., dissenting). In this essay, I am concerned 
primarily with the argument that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act may violate the Four-
teenth Amendment by requiring race-consciousness. The Court could reject this argument 
and nonetheless strike down Section 5 on the narrower grounds that the coverage formula 
is based on outdated data, and not adequately tailored to contemporary political condi-
tions. This would allow Congress to reenact Section 5 to cover states in a way that is more 
closely based on current patterns of voting discrimination, rather than those that existed 
in 1965. See Liptak, supra note 86. 
89 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 22, 32 
(1991) (“The beneficiaries of the status quo tend to . . . conclud[e] that the fate of victims is 
deserved, or is something for which victims are responsible, or is part of an intractable, given, 
or natural order . . . . The reduction of cognitive dissonance thus operates as a significant 
obstacle to the recognition that discrimination is a problem, or even that it exists.”). 
90 See Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and 
Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 Psychol. Bull. 546 (1980); Charles R. Lawrence III, The 
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 
(1987) (arguing that government practices motivated by unconscious racial bias should 
violate equal protection); Benoît Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expres-
sion of Prejudice, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 33, 33–43 (2001). Studies find that 
people are more likely to express prejudicial decisions and attitudes when they perceive 
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force are likely to perceive job applicants with “white-sounding” names 
as better qualified than those with “black-sounding” names.91 Such re-
search suggests that much discrimiantory decision making occurs sub-
consciously, contrary to the good intentions of the decisionmaker. 
Many of those making discriminatory decisions are not conscious of 
their racial motives (indeed actively eschew seeing themselves as being 
motivated by race), and these decisions are not captured when dis-
crimination is defined solely in terms of racial motives. 
 Second, as the Court recognized in Wright v. City of Emporia, look-
ing for racial motivation is inconsistent with the way that official deci-
sions are made.92 In reality, as Justice Stewart’s draft described, policies 
are designed by hundreds of uncoordinated decisions made by officials 
in various capacities, who probably never coalesce around one pur-
posive mental state. Since limiting unconstitutional discrimination to 
racial motivation, the Court has recognized as much, stating, 
“[p]roving the motivation behind official action is often a problematic 
undertaking”93 and “[t]he distinction between being aware of racial 
considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to 
make.”94 Indeed, when Congress reenacted Section 5 in 2006, it spe-
cifically overrode the Court’s recent decision that had narrowed the 
“effect” prong of the section,95 explaining, “over the last 30 years, Sec-
tion 5’s ‘effect’ prong has served to protect the minority communities’ 
ability to elect candidates of choice in covered jurisdictions.”96 
 Congress has repeatedly opted to define illegal discrimination 
more broadly than racial motivation, based on specialized findings 
about the way that discrimination realistically occurs and continues to 
burden constituents. Because Congress is better adept to these policy-
making assessments, the Court recognizes that deference is due when it 
                                                                                                                      
themselves as non-prejudiced. This illustrates that the drive to see oneself as moral and 
non-prejudiced leads people to avoid actions that they consciously recognize as prejudicial, 
and to exhibit more prejudice when they see themselves as non-prejudiced. Monin & 
Miller supra, at 33–43. 
91 Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, Wash. Post Mag., Jan. 23, 2005, at 12, 14–15. 
92 See Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 
U.S. 217, 225 (1971). 
93 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985). 
94 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
95 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479–80 (2003) (“[A] court should not focus solely 
on the comparative ability of a minority group to elect a candidate of its choice.”); H.R. 
Rep. No. 109-478, at 69–71 (2006). 
96 H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 69. 
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judges the constitutionality of an Act of Congress.97 Swann and subse-
quent decisions were consistent with respecting Congress’s policymak-
ing in the areas of school desegregation, employment, housing, and 
voting discrimination. As Swann shows, the contemporary understand-
ing of unconstitutional discrimination gained traction out of deference 
to Congress and the President, who called for limits on constitutional 
remedies being used as a basis for judges making social policy. If the 
Court were to invalidate provisions of the Civil Rights Act on the basis 
that any form of racial motivation is unconstitutional discrimination, it 
would be in some senses contrary to the values underlying Swann. As 
the Court would be making social policy under the guise of a constitu-
tional remedy; doing exactly what provoked the political resistance that 
spurred Swann’s limits on judicial remedies. 
 
97 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 254–55 (2009) (“The 
Congress is a coequal branch of government whose Members take the same oath we do to 
uphold the Constitution of the United States.” (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 
64 (1981)). 
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